Using children's naive theory of biology as a framework, this study examined children's illness conceptions. Children (aged 4-11), presented with one of four exemplars (child, dog, duck or rosebush) suffering an imaginary illness, were asked whether various entities from six categories, biological and non-biological, could also be afflicted. The children's illness generalisations differentiated between all of the categories; they not only distinguished between living and non-living things, but also recognised biological subkinds. Furthermore, the children's generalisations were significantly greater to the category of exemplar, indicating that human prototypicality is not the sole basis for children's generalisations. It is concluded that children's understanding of illness is mediated by a naïve biological theory which facilitates their systematic predictions of susceptibility to illness.
used a Piagetian framework (e.g. Bibace & Walsh, 1981; Perrin & Gerrity, 1981; Rubovits & Siegel, 1994) there have been a few studies conducted from a 'theory' perspective. These studies have found that pre-school children have well-developed theories about the ways certain kinds of illnesses are transmitted, including a cold (Siegal, 1988; Inagaki, 1997) .
Siegelman, Maddock, Epstein and Carpenter (1993) investigated children's understanding of the risk factors involved in catching AIDS, colds and cancer, revealing that children were generally knowledgeable about risk factors but not as competent in rejection of non-risk factors. Furthermore, some studies within a 'theory' perspective have indicated that children's acquisition of an understanding of illness across the biological domain may be problematical with reference to the plant category. Inagaki and Hatano (1996) examined 5-year-old children's generalization of illness from humans to other biological and non-biological entities and found that children were less likely to generalise to plants than to animals. Finney and Taplin (1998) looked at children's generalisations of a germ-based illness to biological and non-biological entities in children aged 5-10. They found very low attributions to plants at all ages and suggested that young children do not include all living kinds in their understanding of the transmission of germ-based illnesses.
However, all these studies which have examined children's understanding of illness using the naïve theory approach have presented the children with known diseases, thus focusing on their acquired knowledge as opposed to their conceptual reasoning about illness. An investigation of children's understanding of illness, using an hypothetical disease as opposed to a cold or other 'real' illnesses, should reveal something of their naive theory of illness.
The present study examined children's understanding of ontological categories in relation to illness, using Keil's (1989) work as a theoretical perspective. He investigated children's ontological knowledge by exploring their understanding of ontological boundaries through transformations (e.g. whether it was possible to turn a horse into a zebra, or a cactus into a porcupine). He revealed that children do have an intuitive taxonomy for structuring the biological domain and that they resist impossible biological transformations while accepting others as more plausible. Therefore, using Keil's general approach, this present study examined children's understanding of 6 ontological categories (humans, mammals, nonmammals, birds, plants and hand-made artefacts) exploring their ontological boundaries for illness by an examination of their predictions about which entities could or could not get ill.
There were three major points of difference from previous studies in this area. First, in order to test Carey's belief that children regard humans as the prototypical biological entity, the study examined children's generalisations of illness from three non-human exemplars (mammal, bird and plant) in addition to a human exemplar. The inclusion of a plant exemplar would also permit a direct examination of the status of plants as a biological category in children's thinking. Furthermore, previous studies have generally used a human exemplar, if any exemplar was used. Secondly, the children were asked about which entities could or could not get 'plinkitis', a made-up illness, in order to give them the opportunity to use their naive theories of illness. As plinkitis is not a real disease, the children were unable to draw upon any specific acquired knowledge about this particular disease, but were forced to use their naive or implicit theories of illness in order to generalise to biological and non-biological entities. Finally, in order to avoid the problems associated with open-ended interviewing of children (i.e. problems caused by children's inability to access and/or verbally express their own knowledge), the children's ontological boundaries were tested by card-sorting tasks.
It was expected that the children would indeed reveal a grasp of biological distinctions in their understanding of illness, but that they would be less likely to generalise illness to the non-biological entities, i.e. hand-made artifacts, thus revealing a comprehension of the distinction between the living and the non-living (Carey, 1985; Keil 1989; Hatano & Inagaki,1994) . It was also predicted that the children's understanding of illness would be based primarily on humans and then extended to other biological categories on the basis of the similarity or proximity between the human and non-human entities (mammals, non-mammals, birds and plants) (Carey 1985) . It was further proposed that the use of non-human exemplars would result in a lower degree of generalisation (Carey, 1985; Inagaki & Hatano, 1991 , Hatano & Inagaki, 1999 . It was also expected that the children would report lower levels of generalisation to plants than to other biological categories. Finally, it was expected that the children's responses would reveal a developing biological understanding, as children gain both in knowledge and theoretical comprehension with age. Furthermore, any such developmental differences might indicate the age at which children exhibit a naïve theory of biology, either supporting Keil's belief (1989) that very young children do display some theoretically-based thinking about biological systems or Carey's view (1995) that very young children's understanding in this area is very limited.
Method

Sample
A total of 280 children were randomly recruited from school years Reception to Year 6 (age range: 4.8-11.6 years) from schools in south-east England. The children were grouped into three age-groups for the purpose of analysis: 1) Young Group containing 120 children from school years Reception, 1 and 2 (64 girls: mean age = 6.2 years, age range = 4.8-7.7 years; 56 boys: mean age = 6.2 years, age range = 4.8-7.8 years); 2) Middle Group containing 80 children from school years 3 and 4 (35 girls: mean age = 8.8 years, age range = 7.8-9.7 years; 45 boys: mean age = 8.7 years, age range = 7.8-9.7 years); 3) Old Group containing 80 children from school years 5 and 6 (38 girls: mean age = 10.6 years , age range = 9.9-11.6 years; 42 boys: mean age = 10.8 years, age range = 9.9-11.6 years).
Materials
Thirty cards, each measuring 5 x 2.5 ins., naming five entities from each of six ontological categories, were used in each of three sorting tasks. On each card, the name of one entity was printed clearly. The ontological categories from which the entity names were drawn were (a) human beings (man, woman, boy, girl, baby), (b) mammals (elephant, cow, sheep, cat, mouse), (c) non-mammals (crocodile, tortoise, frog, butterfly, ant), (d) birds (turkey, swan, chicken, blackbird, robin), (e) plants (oak tree, apple tree, daisy, daffodil, sunflower), and (f) hand-made artifacts (house, car, bicycle, computer, cup). There were three boxes, measuring 9 x 6.5 x 7 ins., representing one of the three possible answers given by the children. Each of the three boxes was labelled with the appropriate words, which were clearly printed on the front: can get plinkitis, cannot get plinkitis, I don't know. Finally, four cards were used, each showing a simple black and white line drawing of one of the exemplars in reference to which children were taught about the imaginary illness. The four exemplars used were a child, a dog, a duck and a rosebush, belonging to the categories of human beings, mammals, birds and plants respectively. The exemplars were chosen from the midpoint size of each range (midpoint size of humans, mammals, birds and plants respectively) in order to minimise the effect of possible biases which might limit children's generalisations based upon the size of exemplars.
followed by non-mammals, and humans, and then plants. The category of hand-made artifacts was seen by all children as significantly the least likely to get plinkitis. However, the differences between humans and mammals, between humans and non-mammals and between mammals and non-mammals were not significant.
Rosebush Exemplar.
When the children were taught that plinkitis is an illness afflicting rosebushes they claimed that plants were significantly more likely than all the other categories to get plinkitis (see Tables 4 and 5 ). After plants they rated humans as more likely to get plinkitis followed by mammals and birds together, followed by non-mammals and hand-made artifacts. However, the differences between humans and mammals, humans and nonmammals, and humans and birds were not significant. Additionally, the differences between mammals and non-mammals, mammals and birds and non-mammals and birds were not significant.
Differences associated with age
There were no main or interaction effects involving age for both the child and dog exemplars.
However, children taught on the duck and rosebush exemplars exhibited significant age x category interaction effects. Post hoc analysis revealed that the age differences for the duck exemplar occurred only in the category of birds (see Table 3 ), where the Young group generalized significantly less to birds than either the Middle or the Old group.
When children were taught on the rosebush exemplar, the post hoc analyses revealed that there were only significant age differences in the category of plants (see Table 4 ), with the Old group generalizing significantly more to plants than either the Young or Middle group.
Response patterns
In addition to the age and category differences identified in the ANOVAS, it was evident that different children presented different response patterns overall about the susceptibility to illness of entities belonging to different ontological categories and according to exemplar. In order to explore these variations, Configural Frequency Analysis (CFA) was used. This form of non-parametric, multivariate analysis of association identifies response patterns which are over-represented (types) and under-represented (anti-types) given the null hypothesis that these patterns are normally and randomly distributed (Krauth, 1985; Von Eye, 1990 ).
Focusing on the children's choices of those entities which can get ill, the children's responses for each category were scored as follows: to those children who chose two or less entities in a category (i.e. a minority of entities) a score of 0 was given; to those children who chose three or more entities in a category (i.e. a majority of entities) a score of 1 was given. Therefore, each child had a score of 0 or 1 for each ontological category and the resulting response pattern for each participant could be characterised as a sequence of 0s and 1s, with the six categories being represented in the following order: humans, mammals, non-mammals, birds, plants and hand-made artifacts. For example, the response pattern 111000 was given to a child who chose three or more entities from the ontological categories of humans, mammals and non-mammals and two or less entities from the ontological categories of birds, plants and hand-made artifacts. The data thus generated were subjected to four CFAs, one for each of the four exemplars, child, dog, duck and rosebush. The results are displayed in Table 6, which shows there were three patterns for the child exemplar, five for the dog exemplar, seven for the duck exemplar and four for the rosebush exemplar, all of which occurred significantly more frequently than would be expected by chance. * * INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE * * In order to investigate any associations between the children's response patterns and age or gender, a new variable was computed corresponding to whether or not each child presented each of the significant response judgement patterns. A series of hierarchical log linear analyses was conducted to assess whether each individual response pattern was significantly associated with either age or gender. No significant associations were found.
Discussion
This study set out to examine children's understanding of illness, using their naïve theory of biology as a framework theory. Overall, the children's assessments of susceptibility to a hypothetical illness displayed an awareness of the distinctiveness of the ontological categories. Depending on the exemplar used, the children's thinking revealed discontinuities between every pair of categories in at least one condition (see Table 5 ).
As these differences were not age-related, this supports the view that children do possess an early grasp of biological distinctions (Keil, 1992; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996) .
Furthermore, there was a paucity of any interactions with age in the study. There were minimal differences in the generalisations from the duck and rosebush exemplars, but overall, the children's differentiation of the ontological categories did not vary across the age-range tested. Furthermore, the significant response patterns identified by the CFAs were not associated with particular ages. All of these findings are further support for children's early acquisition of a naïve theory of biology (Keil, 1992; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996) .
Human prototypicality
Carey (1985) proposed that humans represent the prototypical biological entity for children and that children accordingly base all their biological attributions on their assessments of proximity and/or similarity between humans and any other biological entity. In this study, the children taught on the human exemplar duly generalised most to humans, then mammals, birds, non-mammals, plants and hand-made artifacts in that order. However, other findings did not support Carey's claim of human prototypicality in young children's biological understanding.
For all three non-human exemplars, the dog, duck and rosebush, the approach was the same as for the human exemplar: the children generalised most to the category of the exemplar on which they had been taught. Carey's claim, that children will hold to the human prototype even when exposed to non-human exemplars, is based on her belief that young children have not yet acquired an understanding of the full range of biological categories. Therefore, the readiness of the children in this study to generalise as much from the nonhuman exemplars as from the human one, is further support for the view that children acquire an early understanding of the distinctiveness of biological categories (Keil,1992; Inagaki & Hatano,1996) .
In addition, there were no differences associated with age in the children's generalisations from the child exemplar. If young children do base their generalisations on human prototypicality to a greater extent than older children, then it would be expected that the younger children would generalise more from the child exemplar than the older children.
Therefore, in the absence of any significant differences in the children's generalisations, the results do not support Carey's claim for human prototypicality.
Biological status of plants
With respect to the biological status of plants, there was mixed evidence in the children's responses. The children did generalise the illness less to hand-made artifacts than to plants, except in one condition (dog exemplar), thus supporting the view that they had acquired an understanding of the distinction between living and non-living entities (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996) . Furthermore, when taught on the rosebush exemplar, they weighted their generalisations heavily in favour of the same category (i.e. plants), just as they did for all the other exemplars. On the other hand, when taught on any of the exemplars other than the rosebush, the children generalised least to plants out of the five biological categories and the level of their generalisations to plants was very low overall, suggesting that they construed plants as being very different kinds of biological entities from animals.
These differences in the way in which the children treated plants may have occurred for a number of reasons. First, the use of an unknown illness may have forced the children to resort to their core beliefs about illness, and in particular to a model of illness based on infection or contagion, which has been seen as the prototypical illness for young children (Kalish, 1999) .
If the children were indeed dependent on this model, then they would have been forced to consider the methods for transmission of infection between plants and other categories. Since much of their understanding of contagion depends on proximity, children may well have concluded that the opportunities for close contact with plants were more limited for both humans and animals than the possible contacts between humans and animals. Therefore, these practical considerations may have reduced the level of generalisations regardless of the children's understanding of the biological status of plants.
Secondly, children may hold specific beliefs about illnesses in plants. They may, for example, believe that illnesses affecting plants are more restrictive throughout the biological system, while those affecting humans and animals are more widespread in their scope. On the other hand, they may not have been aware that plants could get ill, unless expressly instructed by the adult researcher to the converse, as was the case with the rosebush exemplar.
Thirdly, there may have been linguistic considerations influencing the children's generalisations. Although the illness description was phrased carefully so as to be applicable to all biological categories, the children may have judged it as more appropriate to human and animal categories than to plants. In particular, the actual use of the word 'illness', though the most suitable term for both humans and animals, and one readily understood and used by the children themselves, nevertheless may have confused the issue, as plants are generally described in the English language as having a disease rather than an illness.
Fourthly, previous research has revealed that young children do include plants in their biological thinking when questioned about certain other biological processes or events, such as life status (Hatano et al., 1993) , the ability to regrow after injury (Backscheider et al., 1993) , the need for food/water and the ability to grow in size (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996) . However, these particular biological aspects are all relatively easy to observe in plants by children, particularly by those who have the opportunity to play in gardens or parks. By the time they enter school, most young children should have had the chance to acquire the knowledge that plants are living entities, that they need water, increase in size and can repair spontaneously after injury, by simple observation. Furthermore, it is with respect to these particular biological aspects that children demonstrate an autonomous theory of biology, which they extend to plants. On the other hand, in the case of illness, as Finney and Taplin found (1998), children tend not to generalise illness to plants when asked about the effects of illness-producing germs. This may reflect the fact that, not only is illness in plants a more uncommon phenomenon than simple growth and care aspects, but illness in any biological entity, other than human, may be an unusual experience for children. Therefore, it may be that the children's responses do not necessarily indicate a less mature comprehension of the category of living entities but may be a consequence of insufficient experience or knowledge of plants.
Finally, the children's perceived discontinuity between plants and animals could simply suggest a sophisticated grasp of their differences. If this is the case, such sophisticated understanding would appear to be present at a very early age.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the children revealed a basic understanding of the distinctiveness of the different ontological categories through their generalisations of illness and, furthermore, this understanding did not appear to change substantially with age. However, human prototypicality was not the only basis for their judgements as they generalised from all the non-human exemplars most to entities within the same category. As for the status of plants, there was some evidence that the children did perceive plants as a separate biological category. However, their tendency to generalise illness least to plants out of the five biological categories would suggest that the status of plants in children's biological understanding is different from that of animals.
These findings suggest that children's understanding of illness is underpinned by an awareness of the different categories of entities which exist in the world, and that children are able to make systematic predictions about entities' susceptibility to illness based upon their knowledge of these categories from the age of 5. 
